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Abstract 
Whereas the amount of hostility found online increases, the scholarly interest in online 
hostility is decreasing. In this article, I discuss three questions central to the study of 
online hostility, namely 1) what role the text, the speaker’s intention and the targets’ 
perception should play in definitions of hostility, 2) whether hostility is always 
destructive or if it can also be productive in the public debate, and 3) how to distinguish 
between destructive and productive hostility? I demonstrate the difficulties in defining 
online hostility and argue that rather than aiming for definite definitions, we should 
acknowledge the situatedness of rhetorical practice and, consequently, that the effects 
and ethical implications of utterances depend on the situation. In doing so, I aim to 
contribute to incite renewed academic interest in flaming and trolling.  
 
Introduction 
In April 2020, the politician Kari Kjønaas Kjos from the Norwegian Progress Party announced 
her decision to leave politics after 15 years. One of the reasons – and certainly the one the mass 
media emphasised in their reporting of the event – was the hostility she experienced in social 
media. ‘The hostility eats into my pleasure of working and wears me out. Society has gotten 
much tougher since I first became a full-time politician fifteen years ago’, she was quoted 
saying (NTB, 2020).  
Three months later, in July 2020, assistant professor, Alexander Sandtorv, at the 
University of Oslo, wrote his last tweet. In this tweet, he announced his retreat from the public 
debate and the closing of all his social media accounts. This was not something that the scholar 
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wanted to do; he wished to continue to be an active voice in the public debate. All the negative 
attention to his person was, however, too much for him to handle. 
These two events illustrate how hostility online today poses a threat to a well-
functioning public sphere, where people freely can express and discuss their concerns, desires, 
opinions and ideas. While hostile communication has always circulated online, many accounts 
suggest that it has become far more prevalent, toxic, as well as gendered today, and that online 
hostility increasingly involves threats or acts of physical violence in offline domains (Jane, 
2015). Worldwide, politicians, journalists, researchers, activists, as well as ‘average’ citizens, 
who raise their voice in public, are being targeted and harassed online. This may lead to self-
censorship and withdrawal from the public debate. As such, online hostility threatens 
individuals’ abilities to exert their freedom of speech and their possibilities to participate in the 
public debate. That is not only a problem for the individual; it is a problem for our democracy. 
Expounding beyond the Norwegian context to consider online rhetoric globally, the 
article discusses how to identify, define and evaluate online hostility – and the particular 
consequences online hostility has for the public debate. I review central parts of the literature 
on online hostility and engage examples of online rhetoric to discuss: 1) what role the text, the 
speaker’s intention and the targets’ perception should play in definitions of hostility, 2) whether 
hostility is always destructive or if it can also be productive in the public debate, and – if so – 
then 3) how to distinguish between destructive and productive hostility? These three questions 
are all central in the literature on online hostility. They reveal fundamental challenges to the 
study of online communications, not just in relation to hostility, but in general. Furthermore, 
these are questions that are central to how we, from a rhetorical perspective, understand human 
communication and communicative processes.  
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While many different types of online behaviours can be hostile – some of them illegal 
according to law, others not – I will focus especially on two concepts that have been central in 
the literature on online hostility, as well as in the public debate, namely flaming and trolling.  
I demonstrate the difficulties in defining online hostility and argue that rather than 
putting our efforts into developing definite definitions, allowing us to immediately recognise 
hostile utterances, we need to acknowledge the situatedness of rhetorical practice and, 
consequently, that the effects and ethical implications of utterances depend on the situation. 
The article, then, contributes to the already vast scholarly literature on online hostility that, 
despite an increase of online hostility, has decreased in recent years (Jane, 2015). The article, 
moreover, aims to contribute with new perspectives to the public conversation, in which online 
hostility is an increasing concern for governments, media professionals, as well as ‘average’ 
citizens.  
 
Defining online hostility, flaming and trolling 
Here, I use the concept of ‘flaming’ as an overall category for hostile online communication. 
Whereas the broader category of ‘online hostility’ encompasses both such hostile 
communications and other acts of hostility, such as hacking, catfishing, sharing and 
downloading illegal pornography, I reserve the term ‘flaming’ for discursive hostility. 
Moreover, some have argued that flaming should be seen not exclusively as an online 
phenomenon, but rather as a ‘communicative episode fundamentally independent of […] the 
communication channel’ (O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003, p. 76). When I, here, use the concept 
of ‘flaming’, I refer to hostility taking place in online environments and ‘hostility’ to refer to 
hostility in general – online, as well as offline. Here, then, I understand ‘flaming’ as hostile 
online communication. 
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 This, relatively, broad discursive category, features several different sub-categories, 
among them trolling (others being, for instance, cyber-bullying and hate speech), which I argue 
should be understood as the online posting of hostile content, to bring about an aggressive 
reaction from the other. This is done primarily for the fun of it, or as the trolls themselves 
commonly call it: for the ‘lulz’, which should be taken to mean ‘laughter at someone else’s 
expense’ (Phillips, 2015). Shortly, I will problematise such definitions of rhetorical practices, 
i.e., definitions based in the intention of the speaker, but for now let us understand trolling as a 
particular form of flaming, namely, as a form of hostile communication, motivated by a wish 
to provoke a reaction – a reaction by which the victim of trolling makes himself the butt of the 
troll’s joke.  
 Whereas the concept of ‘trolling’ seems to be increasingly used – and studied, the 
concept of ‘flaming’ seems to be on the retreat in scholarly work. The majority of research on 
‘flaming’ is quite old, considering the rapidly changing nature of online environments. Most of 
this work is conducted prior to the advent of Web 2.0, and before the emergence of social 
network sites. According to Jane (2015), flaming is largely overlooked and ignored in research 
on online communication today. She points at the absence of the topics of flaming and trolling 
in Springer’s The International Handbook of Internet Research (Hunsinger et al., 2010) and 
The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies (Dutton, 2013), as well as only passing mentions of 
the topics in Wiley-Blackwell’s The Handbook of Internet Studies (Consalvo & Ess, 2011). 
While relatively absent from the handbooks of internet studies, however, the concept of trolling 
is increasingly gaining traction among scholars, who have examined trolling in several different 
online environments, including feminist discussion forums (e.g., Herring et al., 2002), gaming 
forums (e.g., Cook et al., 2018; Hilvert-Bruce & Neill, 2020; Thacker & Griffiths, 2012), 
Wikipedia (Shachaf & Hara, 2010), 4chan and Facebook (e.g., Phillips, 2011, 2015).  
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 The academic interest in ‘flaming’ has – after a period of high interest in the late 80s 
and 90s - however, declined. Here, I wish to draw attention to three central debates in this early 
academic literature on flaming that I argue can assist us in understanding why that is. The bulk 
of this literature is located in the field of social psychology, and revolves around three debates, 
concerning: 1) how to define and conceptualise ‘flaming’; 2) whether ‘flaming’ is the result of 
digital communication technologies or social contexts, and 3) whether flaming is irrational, 
flawed, and troublesome or rational, effective and productive human behaviour.  
 
Conceptualising flames 
The absence of conceptual agreement, I suggest, is a central explanatory factor for the decline 
in academic interest in flaming. Broadly speaking, flaming has been defined in three ways: It 
has been defined by reference to features of the texts; it has been defined by reference to the 
speaker’s intention, and it has been defined by reference to the target and/or, other audiences’ 
perception. In the literature on flaming, a shift is observable over time: Whereas early accounts 
of flaming commonly defined flaming based in the textual elements, later definitions have 
commonly emphasised the speaker’s intention and the target’s experience as the central 
defining element of a flame. What the definitions share, is that flaming is equated to disinhibited 
(online) behaviour. Apart from that, the definitions are commonly vague, broad and ambiguous.  
Definitions located at the textual level, have conceptualized ‘flaming’ as everything 
from curse words and ‘typographic energy’ (i.e., the use of exclamation marks and capital 
letters), to vague notions of criticism, emotional expressions and norm violation. Some 
definitions can illustrate the conceptual confusion: Flaming has been defined as discourse that 
includes negative affect, profanity and ‘typographic energy’ (Lea et al., 1992), ‘antisocial 
interaction’ (Thompsen, 1996), ‘an insult’ (Herring, 1996), ‘emotional outbursts’ (Korenman 
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& Wyatt, 1996), ‘hostile verbal behavior’ (Thompsen & Foulger, 1996), ‘verbal aggression’, 
‘blunt disclosure’, and non-conforming behavior’ (Parks & Floyd, 1996). 
Advocating for intention- and perception-based definition of flames, many scholars – 
many of them also located within the field of social psychology, but also within communication 
and media studies – have problematised definitions that are based in the features of the text 
alone. With good reason. Not only are many of the definitions vague and ambiguous, they are 
also, I argue, treating many vernacular rhetorical forms that are not necessarily hostile, as 
hostile – and vice versa. Let me illustrate this by offering some examples that could typically 
be found in comment sections online (for a discussion of the rhetorical strategies characteristic 
of social media, see Andersen, 2020): 
 
1) ‘I’m so fucking tired of all the numbskulls who comment without reading the 
article! At least try to substantiate your infantile claims!!’  
 
2) ‘You’re not Norwegian, are you? I hope you get sent out of the country.’ 
 
In many early studies of flaming, where researchers commonly set out to code instances of 
flaming in various discussion forums, to examine how widespread flaming was in different 
online environments and whether flaming was more widespread within some social contexts 
than others (e.g., Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Kayany, 1998; Kiesler et al., 1984; McCormick & 
McCormick, 1992), the first of these two utterances would probably be classified as a flame. 
And perhaps the second one would not (see also, O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003, pp. 72-74). 
But is the first utterance really hostile? And is the second one not? The first contains 
swearing and invectives. It calls other people ‘numbskulls’. It is written in a hostile tone. But 
is it hostile toward another person? Or is it rather sanctioning the utterances of others – 
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utterances that, according to the speaker, are not adhering to good debate standards? The second 
utterance does not contain swearing, emotional outbursts or typographic energy. It consists of 
a (rhetorical) question: ‘You’re not Norwegian, are you?’ and expresses the speaker’s personal 
hope for the future: ‘I hope you get sent away’. We might, however, assume that this is both 
intended and experienced as a hostile personal attack targeting the nationality or ethnicity of 
the other. As such, it a more hostile utterance than the first, as it targets the person, not the issue 
or the person’s utterances.  
This demonstrates the difficulties in determining whether an utterance is hostile or not, 
based on a set of criteria for what constitutes hostile elements in a text. It is not surprising, then, 
that some scholars have turned to other ways of conceptualising flames, namely by reference 
to the speaker’s intention and/or the target’s perception of hostility.  
One especially influential account, that advocates an approach to both the speaker’s 
intention and the audience’s perception, in determining whether something is or is not a flame, 
is O’Sullivan and Flanagin’s article: Reconceptualizing ‘flaming’ and other problematic 
messages (2003). They define a ‘flame’ as ‘a message in which the creator/sender intentionally 
violates interactional norms and is perceived as violating those norms by the receiver as well 
as by third-party observers’ (p. 85). Moreover, as the title of their article suggests, they 
distinguish between ‘true’ flames and ‘other problematic messages’. While their definition of 
flames emphasises both the speaker’s intention, the target’s perception and third-party 
observer’s perceptions of the message, their definition of a ‘true’ flame, prioritises the speaker’s 
intention. ‘True’ flames, they argue, are, ‘intentional (whether successful or unsuccessful) 
negative violations of (negotiated, evolving, and situated) interactional norms’ (p. 84).  
 Studies have suggested that – although some flamers do intentionally offend and hurt 
others – much of what might be experienced as flaming by others, is rather an immediate, 
affective reaction (Cheng et al., 2017) or is meant or functions to express disagreement, affect 
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or is a form of humorous play (Moor et al., 2010). As such, it does make sense to privilege the 
speaker’s intentions, over the audience’s experiences.  
 We could, however, turn this around and privilege the target's experiences of the 
utterance. An utterance may be experienced as hostile also when the speaker's intention was not 
to harm. Moreover, if an utterance is experienced as harmful it is, necessarily, harmful – it has 
caused someone harm. Jane (2015) has, therefore, suggested that the experience of flame targets 
should be privileged over the experience of flame producers when determining the function of 
and evaluating the ethical implications of online discourse.  
 Evaluating utterances based on how these are perceived is, however, not 
straightforward. A recent study found that 7.2 per cent of a representative sample of the 
Norwegian population had received what they perceived as hate speech online (Fladmoe & 
Nadim, 2017). Most of the reported utterances were, however, not directed towards protected 
grounds (i.e., ethnicity, nationality, skin colour, religion, disability or sexual orientation) and 
are, thus, not hate speech according to legal definitions (cf. Waldron, 2012). Rather, many of 
the utterances perceived as hate speech were directed at the content of the target’s claims and 
arguments (Fladmoe & Nadim, 2017, pp. 58-59).  
 Having studied sanctions and negotiations of norms in Facebook comment section 
debates, I, similarly, find that most of what is sanctioned for being personal attacks in these 
debates is criticism directed towards the claims and arguments and, thus, what we could call 
‘adequate answers’ (cf. Kock, 2018) in a public debate (Andersen, 2020). This suggests that the 
popular comprehension of what is hostile online may be so broad that too many utterances will 
be labelled hostile if we are to base our evaluations solely on the audience’s perceptions.  
An obvious problem, if we define ‘flames’ by reference to the speaker’s intention and/or 
the target’s perception is, then: ‘When the producer’s intention and the target’s perception of 
an utterance differs – whose definition do we privilege? As rhetorical scholars have often 
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underscored: Rhetoric does something to an audience, but this something is seldom – if ever – 
the same to all audiences. Utterances will always carry different meanings for different 
audiences – and have different effects on different audiences. Defining utterances based on the 
effect it has on its audience is, therefore, not straightforward. It is, however, not straightforward 
to define an utterance based on the speaker’s intention either. Rhetorical messages are not 
always crafted with a clear aim of what the utterance is to do – they may be uttered as an in-
the-heat of the moment, highly affective reaction. And utterances that are crafted with a clear 
intention, do not always do what they are intended to do – and they do not do the same to all 
people. In other words: Utterances that are not intended to harm someone might harm someone 
– and vice versa. An utterance that is experienced as hostile by some – may not be experienced 
as such by others. And besides, how can we know what someone – other than ourselves – 
actually meant and felt? 
To detect and evaluate hostility online, we should rather, I argue, take the text as our 
starting point. We should, however, not only look at the features of the texts, rather we need to 
examine the texts and their context.  
Having discussed all the problems related to existing definitions of flaming, you might 
now expect me to offer a good, clear-cut definition that can guide our interpretation of texts in 
context. I will not offer such a definition. As the discussion of various ways of defining hostility 
online has demonstrated, there are good reasons to caution against trying to reduce the 
complexity of online practices by offering clear, simple and universally valid definitions. These 
practices are always relative, interactional, negotiable and context-dependent and, therefore, I 
will rather advise us to understand and approach them as such. A rhetorical, humanistic 
perspective may, in this regard, be of great value, when examining hostility online. This 
perspective emphasises how utterances are situated and contingent (Kjeldsen, 2008). It stresses 
that the context of communication guides both the speaker’s actions and the audiences’ 
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interpretations of these. Consequently, utterances – and their potential functions – should be 
seen as inseparable from the context in which they occur. By approaching the phenomenon of 
online hostility from this perspective, we acknowledge that we cannot – and should not – strive 
to offer definite conclusions on how an utterance functions. Rather, practices and norms are 
continuously being negotiated through human interaction and, consequently, we should also 
continuously describe and evaluate these practices as they occur in different contexts.  
 
Digital media: Hostile rhetorical cultures?  
The second debate that has been central in the literature on online hostility concerns whether 
‘flaming’ is the result of digital communication technologies or social contexts. The first 
position regards negative behaviours as a consequence of the lack of social cues and restraints 
in digital environments, where anonymity and the absence of non-verbal cues, such as body 
language and tone, is thought to elicit asocial and unrestrained behaviour (Kiesler et al., 1984; 
Kiesler et al., 1985; Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2011; Suler, 2004). The latter position sees 
flaming as social-context dependent, i.e., as a consequence of particular topics, the participants’ 
background and affiliation, the different forums for discussion, rather than a characteristic of 
the medium (Kayany, 1998; Lea et al., 1992; O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003; Spears & Lea, 
1992).  
Flaming, I argue, should be seen as a consequence both of the technology and the 
particular social context in which it appears. More precisely, digital technology should be seen 
as a central part of the social context of utterances as different digital media affords certain 
rhetorical actions, while obstructing others (Miller & Sheperd, 2004; Vatnøy, 2017).  
At the same time, digital technology is, in contrast to at the time when much research 
on flaming was conducted (i.e., in the late 80s and 90s), not something fundamentally new and 
exterior to human behaviour. Rather, digital technology has become such a natural part of most 
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people’s everyday lives that we have become one with the technology (Hess, 2014). While still 
present, anonymity and the lack of non-verbal cues are, moreover, far from the only ways in 
which we communicate online today. Research suggests that users of social network sites often 
dismiss notions of anonymity and multiple identities in favour of self-expression and bodily 
identity (Boler, 2007; Kennedy, 2006), and today’s online communication happens through 
written text, images, sound and video alike.  
While the affordances of digital media, direct the users’ practices, by making some 
actions more attainable than others, the actual use of the technology depends on the users’ 
ability and willingness to utilise these affordances (Davisson & Leone, 2018, p. 88; 92). As 
such, the technology’s affordances do not determine, but shape ‘the possibility of agentic action 
in relation to an object’ (Hutchby, 2001, 444). As such, digital technology per se does not elicit 
asocial and unrestrained behaviour but can, indeed, facilitate it. For instance, the logics of social 
media are often said to favour issues that are emotive, moral and controversial (Barberá et al., 
2015; Eberholst & Hartley, 2014; Tenenboim & Cohen, 2015), and debates concerning these 
issues are, in turn, found to be dominated by flaming and polarisation, rather than deliberation 
(Janssen & Kies, 2005; Wales et al., 2010).  There are, however, differences between different 
platforms. Each platform presents a different social context due to its unique affordances, user 
base, and the particular topics, emotions and genre conventions that are regarded to be 
appropriate by the users of the platform (O’Riordan et al., 2012; Vatnøy, 2017; Waterloo et al., 
2018). 
Here, I wish to change the perspective from debating whether flaming is a consequence 
of digital technology or social contexts, to draw attention to how online hostility may be seen 
as part of a particular ‘internet culture’, characterised by overwhelming irony and detached 
laughter, and where a hostile, yet playful tone, is not only tolerated but expected. In other words: 
A rhetorical culture in which hostility is the norm. By ‘rhetorical culture’, I here refer to the 
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configuration of a typical communication situation, world view – including both a view of truth, 
morality, humanity and language – and a particular rhetorical style . A rhetorical culture is, 
thus, constituted by who speaks and who listens, cultural and technological conditions, the 
language available under these conditions, as well as the norms and conventions that govern 
the communication (for an extended discussion of the concept of ‘rhetorical cultures’, see 
Andersen, 2020, p. 4ff).  
 The rhetorical culture that has been called the ‘internet culture’, should according to 
Phillips (2019), be dated to the period between 2008-2012. This rhetorical culture ‘aligned with 
and reproduced the norms of whiteness, maleness, middle-classness, and the various tech-slash-
geek interests stereotypically associated with middle-class white dudes’ (Phillips, 2019, p. 2). 
In describing the norms of this rhetorical culture, Phillips also describes the speakers’ and 
audiences of this culture. They are predominantly young, white, technically skilled, middle-
class dudes, who communicated and ‘hung out’ online, prior to the advent and extensiveness of 
social media, when suddenly all of us started hanging out on the internet. This internet culture 
has a rich tradition of spectacle and transgression (Coleman, 2012, p. 101), and an important 
norm in this internet culture is that everything is ‘just for the lulz’, i.e., laughter at someone 
else’s expense (Phillips, 2011, 2015, 2019). 
This resonates well with the world view of the participants in this rhetorical culture, 
which has been extensively discussed by Whitney Phillips (2015, 2019) and Gabriella Coleman 
(2012), in particular in relation to problematic online behaviours, such as trolling and hacking. 
Trolls and hackers’ attitude to the world are summed up in the phrase: Everything is "just for 
the lulz’, i.e., everything is just for the fun of it. Moreover, they commonly distinguish between 
the online world – and the online self – and the real world – and the real self. Who they are, and 
what they do, in the online world do not represent who they are in the real world but is 
fundamentally disconnected from their real, offline selves. Finally, the participants in the 
 13 
internet culture display an extreme, selfish understanding of liberty – in particular of freedom 
of speech: They understand freedom of speech as liberty for me, without concerns for how one’s 
actions and utterances may impose on other’s freedoms.  
The increased access to the internet in the early 2000s and the emergence of many 
popular social network sites, made the masses join the internet. From previously being a place 
in which the technically savvy and particularly interested communicated, the digital sphere now 
became inhabited by a bunch of people who were not familiar with the rhetorical culture and 
its norms. Those who were familiar with the codes, then, took advantage of this so that they 
could laugh. In particular, the ways in which social network sites encourages self-centeredness 
and the authentic, heartfelt expression, is something that the trolls, according to Phillips (2015), 
have taken advantage of. They see an opportunity in this ego investment and emotional 
sensitivity: By trolling people acting this way online – they can produce laughter for 
themselves. As both Phillips (2015) and Coleman (2012) have pointed out, such trolling may 
also be a way to protest against this tendency of narcissism in our current culture and to signal 
that the online world is their world, not ours. The hostile behaviours of trolls could be seen as 
a ‘virtual fence adorned with a sign bearing the following message: ‘keep (the hell) out of here, 
this is our Homeland’ (Coleman, 2012, p. 113).  
What also happens – over time – is that the norms of this rhetorical subculture are 
cultivated and taken up in mass culture. Just as the punk and the jeans became mainstream, 
trolling and other forms of hostility have also been taken up in mainstream culture. Trolls are 
no longer a subculture of technically savvy nerds, rather – as suggested by the title of an 
experimental study conducted by researchers in computer science – ‘anyone can become a troll’ 
(Cheng et al., 2017, italics added). Flaming has been described as the lingua franca of the 
internet (Jane, 2014a, 2014b; Jane, 2015), and John Hartley’s (2010) term ‘silly citizenship’ 
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have become influential in describing the sort of detached, ironic and playful forms of 
participation facilitated online. 
 Such descriptions point to how hostility has – by a long way – become normalised 
online and is not only tolerated but expected in online communications. Hostility is, in other 
words, a norm, developed in a marginalised rhetorical culture, that now seems to have been 
taken up in mainstream culture and constitutes a threat to a well-functioning public sphere. 
From an initial celebration of democratising potential of participatory media, which made large-
scale many-to-many communication possible (Benkler, 2006; Hindman, 2009; Shirky, 2008), 
media organisations and journalists, global organisations, national governments and political 
actors, as well as scholars, now increasingly raise concerns about social network sites’ and other 
digital media’s influence on the public debate. 
 
Destructive, harmless or productive hostility? 
The article opened with some recent examples of what the consequences of the normalisation 
of online hostility may be, namely that scholars, politicians, journalists, activists, as well as 
‘average’ citizens, may self-censor or entirely retreat from the public life, due to experiencing 
much online hostility. Other people who haven’t yet, but might want to, engage in the public 
debate and voice their opinion publicly, might be obstructed from doing so, as they see that 
they, in doing so, run the risk of being harassed, hated and threatened online.  
 In the beginning of the article I, moreover, suggested that the third central debate in the 
literature on ‘flaming’ concerned whether this hostility is destructive or productive (Lea et al., 
1992) – a dispute that may follow directly from the absence of conceptual agreement, discussed 
earlier. In early accounts of flaming, the phenomenon was predominantly treated as a negative 
and problematic consequence of new communication technology. Later, more positive – 
 15 
sometimes even celebratory – accounts of flaming as either harmless or productive uses of 
digital technology, have dominated.  
 I argue that online hostility should not be seen as either destructive or productive, but 
rather as both destructive and productive. I advocate an approach to online hostility, that 
underscores the situatedness of rhetoric, and consequently argue that the effects and ethical 
implications of utterances depend on the situation.  
 I begin by outlining some potentially negative consequences of online hostility. First, as 
the two examples retold in the introduction illustrated, one problem is that people might refrain 
from participating in the public debate. Studies of the users of social media show that the fear 
of being subjected to hostile remarks and behaviours is an important reason for why many 
refrain from sharing their opinions publicly and abstain from participation in public debates 
online (Kruse et al., 2018; Thorson et al., 2015; Vromen et al., 2016). This is a problem for the 
individual, who is obstructed from using his or her freedom of speech. It is also a problem for 
democracy, as we run the risk of getting a public debate, where some views and perspectives 
are absent. Considering the direction of much hostility, which is often gendered and racially 
charged – more commonly performed by white men, and targeting women and minorities 
(Fladmoe & Nadim, 2017; Jane, 2014a, 2014c; Phillips, 2015), the consequence of people 
abstaining from participation in the public debate due to a fear of harassment, might be a skewed 
public debate, in which the voices of some groups are lesser represented than others. 
A second problem that we face, is that discrimination, hatred and hostility is increasingly 
normalised. If hostility is the lingua franca online – if it is something we not only accept, but 
also expect – then we could contribute to the normalisation, and thereby, possibly also increase, 
of hostile behaviour – both online and in the worst case, also offline. In the mass media, as well 
as in the early academic works on flaming, there has been a tendency to take this position to 
online hostility. In particular, the mass media has tended to sensationalise the dangers of the 
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internet and ascribe this with grave consequences. In particular, the view that hostile utterances 
may incite physical violence has commonly been voiced (Jane, 2015, pp. 73-74; Phillips, 2013).  
Perhaps as a reaction to this, more recent academic works have tended to downplay the 
harmful consequences of online hostility, and rather examine the possibly productive outcomes 
of it. As for example Esther Milne has argued, in a critique of the tendency to always treat 
flaming as something negative, such interpretations of flaming ‘do not allow any scope for 
exploring the productive or creative capacity of flaming within group and individual identity 
formation’ (Milne, 2010, p. 172, italics in original). 
A common understanding of online hostility today is that much of what might seem like 
hostile is misunderstood online humour, or a way of being on the internet that does not have, 
or is not meant to have real, in-life implications. For instance, Phillips (2015), argues that trolls 
view their hostile behaviour as something that is ‘just for fun’ online, rather than actions that 
are meant to cause harm in the real world. Similarly, I have argued that many instances of 
hostile behaviours in comment section debates on Facebook, should be understood primarily as 
rhetorical performances aimed at securing the final say for oneself and suggest that this is a way 
to safeguard one's authentic expression from the intervention of others (Andersen, 2020, p. 
239ff). I have, thus, suggested that this type of hostility is without external consequences – it 
serves a function within the interaction – but is unlikely to have consequences outside of the 
interaction.  
While some have argued that online hostility is harmless, others have argued that it is – 
not only harmless – but even a productive, and necessary, resource in the digital public sphere. 
The main arguments in these accounts can be read as echoing much rhetorical and political 
thinking on the role of confrontation of conflict in the public sphere, of hostility as an integral 
part of political argumentation, and of insults and invectives as rhetorical means for sanctioning 
violations of the community’s norms and values (e.g., Amossy, 2010a; Jørgensen, 1998; Lund, 
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2012). Moreover, there is an underlying assumption here, that directness – even hostility – is a 
more effective and ethical mode of confrontation in the public debate, than politeness and 
civility. Because political rhetoric is concerned with choices between conflicting choices, 
values and beliefs (cf. Kock, 2009), too much civility obscures the public debate. It does so, by 
concealing the conflicts and the affections, with which these are held. Moreover, when I 
criticise you, while still being polite about it, I make myself untouchable. You cannot fight 
back; you cannot come up with a counterattack. I was – after all – polite. As such, hostile 
criticism puts adversaries on equal terms, whereas politeness obstructs the object of criticism 
from ‘fighting back’.  
Returning to the hostility we can find online, different scholars have found it to be 
productive both at a micro-, meso-, and macro-level of the public sphere. At the micro-level, 
hostility has been seen as a way for the individual to be creative, it serves entertainment 
purposes, it educates, and it is a resource in the formation and enactment of individual identity 
(Lange, 2007; Postmes et al., 2000; Vrooman, 2002; Wang, 1996).  
At the meso-level of the public sphere, hostility has been said to serve as a resource in 
the formation of group-identity, relationship-building, as well as in upholding a community's 
norms and values (Douglas, 2008; Kuntsman, 2007; Postmes et al., 2000). Moreover, flame-
producing trolls are said to protest against and may, thereby, contribute to renew our culture. 
Phillips (2013, 2015) argues that trolling may be understood as a protest against the mass 
media’s tendency to sensationalise events, as well as a social media culture, in which authentic 
self-expression and narcissism prevail. Coleman (2012, p. 102), furthermore, argues that the 
hostile behaviours of trolls (and hackers) could be seen as a way to protect the digital sphere – 
the troll’s and the hacker’s homeland – against easy comprehension and ‘cultural co-optation 
and capitalist commodification that so commonly prey on subcultural forms’. 
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At the macro-level of the public sphere, hostility can be seen as a necessary, and 
inherent, part of the digital public sphere and digital citizenship. Here, I will outline two main 
claims about the productivity of hostility in the digital public sphere. The first claim is that 
online hostility is a productive provocation and an integral part of agonistic digital citizenship. 
The claim is grounded in the assumption that conflict and confrontation are not only inevitable 
but necessary in a well-functioning public sphere and that, even the most hostile, verbal 
expressions of conflict are, in the long run, what ties us together as publics (cf. Mouffe, 2005). 
In other words: Even when we are fighting, mocking, and hating, we are maintaining contact 
with the ‘other’ – we are relating to one another – and this is better than ignoring or repressing 
one another.  
This claim is promoted in Amossy’s (2010b) article on flaming as a discursive and 
argumentative phenomenon pertaining to polemical discourse. Flaming should, according to 
Amossy, be understood as verbal expressions of social and political conflicts that exist beyond 
these online spaces and serves as a peculiar form of conflict management in society. Amossy 
(2010a, 2010b) views polemical discourse, and thereby also flames, as a legitimate 
argumentative mode and tone of voice in the public sphere. Verbal violence, in the form of 
polemics, she argues, is a way – in fact, it is the only way, for adversaries to co-exist within a 
shared social space. It is the only way for adversaries to ‘live together while sustaining opposing 
claims and holding antithetical views’ (Amossy, 2010a, p. 59) Verbal violence, she argues, 
supersedes and prevents physical fighting and political repression, as the inherent conflicts are 
channelled through discourse, relating people to one another, while upholding their dissent and 
disagreements. 
Similar to this argument, is McCosker’s (2014) take on online hostility as an integral 
part of agonistic digital citizenship. He views flames as provocations that play a legitimate and 
productive role in pluralistic, agonistic societies. In a similar manner to Amossy’s take on the 
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polemic, he underscores the role of contact between adversaries – even when hostile – in forging 
bonds of identification. He argues that hostility online is best understood in an ‘agonistic sense 
of searching for an adversary and trying to best them, or at least maintain contact; and in 
response, to shore up bonds of identification and agreement’ (McCosker, 2014, p. 215).  
I have now outlined some conflicting positions on the place of online hostility in the 
public debate. I have argued that it can be destructive as it may prevent people from 
participating, and thus may result in a public debate where not all voices and perspectives are 
represented. I, then, went on to argue that much online hostility may just be ‘harmless fun’, or 
serve other purposes within the particular interaction, but that does not have external 
consequences. Finally, I suggested that online hostility may even be productive in the public 
sphere – both on an individual level, for the group, and as a way for people with conflicting 
views, beliefs and values to be able to co-exist in our shared social and cultural space. I do not 
privilege any of these positions over others, rather I argue that online hostility may be 
destructive, harmless and productive – and whether it is this or that, depends on the context of 
the utterance.  
How, then, can we distinguish between hostile utterances that are damaging to 
individuals, groups and democracy – and hostile utterances that are without real, in-life 
consequences – or that are even productive?  
 
How do we proceed from here?  
I have grounded my argument in the understanding of utterances as situated and context-
dependent, and will necessarily, call for approaches to online hostility that are able to take both 
utterances – and the context of utterances – into consideration. This is challenging for all studies 
of communication between human beings but is something that becomes especially challenging 
when we are dealing with communication in digital environments. Online both texts and 
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contexts are complex, changing and incalculable (Kjeldsen, 2008; Hess, 2018). Communication 
online is characterised by intertextuality, inconsistency, immediacy, pace and fragmentation 
(Kjeldsen, 2008; Warnick, 1998, 2007). Contexts are countless and indefinite online, and the 
lines between different contexts, for instance between a private and a public context, are not 
clear-cut. Texts and discourses are fragmented and circulated – often far removed from their 
original context and speaker. Fragments from rhetorical utterances are shared and re-
contextualised, commonly in multimodal utterances, such as ‘memes’ or ‘mash-ups’. Thereby, 
texts gain new meaning, and in many cases, audiences only encounter the re-contextualised 
version of a text. Moreover, audiences are often invisible (boyd, 2008), and the communication 
(at least when written), is stripped of non-verbal cues that can guide of interpretation.  
Moreover, genre conventions and communicative norms are constantly being 
challenged, contested and negotiated (Andersen, 2020, p. 271ff). What may be a norm to one 
participant in an interaction, might be a norm-violation for the other.  This makes it extremely 
challenging – something that I think the literature on ‘flaming’ shows – to distinguish hostility 
from utterances that carry other functions – and to distinguish between hostility that is harmful 
and critique-worthy, hostility that is just ‘harmless fun’, and hostility that may even be 
productive in the public sphere. This does, however, not mean that we should not try.  
The most productive way forward, I argue, is to assume perspectives on human 
communication found in the humanities – and to continuously describe and evaluate these 
practices, as they occur in different contexts. Rhetorical theory has always been concerned with 
how human communication and experience is situated and context dependent. As such, the 
rhetorical perspective has shown an ability to deal with fragmented and complex situations, and 
to adjust to changing technological circumstances, and changing rhetorical practices and norms. 
We should continue to examine the texts and contexts, in which hostility occurs – or 
may occur – online, and we should always examine both texts and contexts together. We should 
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not attempt to offer any definite, universal discourse ethics, that allows us to – once and for all 
– determine whether certain utterances are hostile or not and whether this hostility is 
destructive, harmless or productive. Rather, we must remember that how an utterance functions 
– and the ethical implications of that – always depend on the situation in which it occurs.  
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